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SECTION I- Introduction 
Modern futures are a tactical procedure by which traders buy or sell a commodity 
in the future. They came about because of the inadequate marketplace of the mid-1800's. 
''Problems of supply and demand, transportation, and storage, however, led to a chaotic 
market place and the logical development of futures markets" (Catania 3). When harvest 
time came around, farmers' grain yields would far exceed the needs of the local millers. 
The millers knew this and would bid the farmers down to just pennies for a bushel of 
wheat or com. These were the lucky farmers. The other farmers who harvested their 
crops later in the year found a market place that was supersaturated. Often they would 
end up dumping the grain on Chicago's city streets, where it spoiled. These problems 
with supply and demand created an unreliable market that made farming more difficult and 
the end consumers never knew what prices to expect at the local grocery store. 
This was only one phase of the problem though. Some years there were droughts 
and other disasters that caused the crops to fail. At times like these, supplies dwindled, 
prices soared, and people went hungry. Businesses became insolvent because they lacked 
the necessary raw materials to produce marketable goods. Farmers had food for their 
families but no income to pay for manufactured goods. It is apparent that without a fair 
market for goods, chaos ruled the day. 
To rid themselves of chaos, farmers started to deal in forward contracts which 
stated that goods would be delivered in the future for an already set price. The first of 
these contracts was for 3000 bushels of com in 1851. These contracts immediately 
proved their usefulness because they were so much better than the prior markets that 
suppliers and purchasers had experienced. 
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But these early forward contracts did have shortcomings dealing with a means of 
standardization. There were no set quantities that forward contracts held. Even more 
importantly, there were no set quality standards to be met. The result was the times for 
delivery varied with every forward contract. To help offset these concerns, the Chicago 
Board of Trade took measures to standardize grain forward contracts by developing the 
futures contract. 
The futures contract is one of the most common mechanisms to complete a sale 
between a buyer and seller for commodity traders. This contract is a "standardized, legal 
agreement to make or take delivery of a specific commodity at a designated place 
sometime in the future" (Catania 11 ). The commodities market place started out in the 
late 1800's by trading butter, eggs, milk, com, wheat, soybeans, coffee, and cotton. 
The market place is filled with two types of people. The first type are speculators 
because they actually do not want to make or take delivery of the commodity, but rather 
seek to profit from a change in the price. This group of people is willing to accept 
considerable risk for the opportunity of making a substantial monetary gain. They buy 
when anticipating rising prices and sell when anticipating falling prices. For obvious 
reasons, they do not bet their monthly mortgage payment on a market direction. The 
second group of people, called hedgers, make up the producers, processors, storehouses, 
and other brokers who wish to buy or sell the actual commodity. When hedgers purchase 
or sell a commodity, they successfully establish a known price level weeks or months in 
advance of the time they actually wish to make the exchange. 
These two types of traders participate in all of the commodity markets around the 
world. "One of the most important is the CBO, The Chicago Board of Trade, which 
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executes contracts in agricultural commodities" (Mayo 667). This is not the only place 
where agricultural futures contracts can be bought or sold. For example, because of 
geography, wheat markets exist in Kansas City and l\finneapolis. Individual brokers trade 
these commodities. The broker or the brokerage firm for which he works owns a seat on 
the commodity exchange. This "seat" gives him the right to bid and offer at open outcry 
the commodity being traded. Nevertheless, on needs to understand that futures terms can 
be misleading. For instance, to say that one wishes to buy a contract actually means that 
he wants the right to be able to buy a certain product in the future. The same holds true 
for selling a contract. 
For example, let's say that farmer Jones has approximately 500,000 bushels of 
com in his fields that will be ready to harvest in November. He has been watching the 
price of corn, and at this point the price is at a ten-year high, $3 .25 per bushel. Farmer 
Jones knows that he can make a profit by selling his com at this price. More importantly, 
he will be satisfied with this price. So in order for Jones to sell his unharvested com today 
at $3.25 per bushel, he needs some facility to do this. The Chicago Board of Trade is his 
solution. He calls a local commodity broker and offers to sell 500 contracts of com 
futures. Each com future has a trading unit of 1, 000 bushels. His broker in tum sends 
the order into the Chicago Board of Trade where it is sold at open outcry in the trading 
pit. The buyers of these contracts have just received the rights to 1,000 bushels of com 
per contract delivered to them in December, at a price of$3.25 per bushel. To protect the 
buyers of this contract, the com will have to meet a set standard or else a discount will be 
given to the buyers. 
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Leverage is the most important key behind profits and losses, and means the 
ability to control the whole value of a futures contract with only a fraction of the actual 
price. Think again about those 500 com future contracts which farmer Jones sold. The 
purchasers of those contracts at $3 .25 per bushel might only be required to have a capital 
margin on account of$.30 per bushel. They only need $.30 per bushel x 1000 bushels per 
contract for a total of$300 to control a contract ofDecember com worth $3250. This 
capital is not payment for the futures contract, but it is a security deposit to ensure 
contract performance. If the price ofDecember com rises, then the purchasers will not 
have a margiii call. But if the price of December com falls lower than $3.25 a bushel, then 
the purchaser of the contract will have to provide additional funds, or else the contract will 
be sold by the broker to settle the account. 
That is how leverage works by allowing a small capital monetary percentage to 
control the total contract. The smaller the margin requirement in relation to the size of the 
futures contract, the greater the leverage. If a person speculates in futures contracts and 
the price moves in the direction that is favorable to him, leverage will yield large profits in 
relation to the required margin. On the other hand, if the price moves in an adverse 
direction, then large losses will quickly mount against the beginning capital margin 
requirement. Thus, leverage is a two-edged sword. 
For example, if a buyer assumes that stock prices will rise, he will purchase one 
March S&P 500 stock index futures contract at 800. Also, assume that their stock 
brokers require them to keep $10,000 in an account as a margin requirement. Since the 
value of the future contract is $500 times the index, each I point move in the index 
represents a $500 gain or loss. 
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Therefore, an increase in the stock index from 800 to 820 would double the 
amount ofthe margin deposited with the broker from $10,000 to $20,000. Conversely, a 
decrease from 800 to 780 would completely wipe out all the capital margin requirement 
with the broker. That makes a 100% gain on the margin with only a 2.5% change in the 
stock index! 
An absolute prerequisite for anyone considering trading in futures contracts is to 
clearly understand leverage as well as any gain or loss that will result from any given 
change in the futures price of the particular contract being traded. If you cannot afford the 
risk, or even if you are uncomfortable with the risk, the only sound advice is ''Don't 
trade". Futures trading is definitely not for everyone. 
Margins and leverage are directly linked to each other. "A margin payment on a 
futures contract is a performance bond guaranteeing that both the buyer and the seller will 
perform according to the terms of the contract" (Sander 8). This margin is not a down 
payment, but it can be thought of as an insurance policy for the broker. As has been 
shown above, a very small change in the S&P 500 stock index can completely wipe out a 
margin deposit. This type of price movement necessitates the margin requirements. 
Maintenance on these margin accounts differs between brokers and brokerage houses. 
Also, a speculator can assume a higher margin requirement because he doesn't have any 
other cash positions which can counteract adverse price movement. 
A further market risk is Volatility. When the market is experiencing large price 
movements, it is said to be very volatile. Therefore, a market with high volatility is one 
with high risk. For example, in 1988 the December corn future had been trading at around 
40,000 contracts per day for the last five months. Then on May 16, it burst out with 
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63,000 contacts after the mid-west grain report was issued. The report stated that fewer 
acres of com were actually planted then previously estimated because of the wet spring. 
This report sparked the price increase from $2.25 a bushel up to $3.70 per bushel. During 
this rise in price the volume of com contracts peaked at 126,000 traded per day. "The 
volume/price behavior ofDecember com is representative of all the futures markets and 
instructs us that dramatic price changes are accompanied by significant changes in 
volume" (Kroll133). During these times brokerage houses require a larger percentage of 
a commodity contract's price in a margin account. Thus, this three-way relationship 
between leverage, margins, and volatility is very important to futures traders. 
Castleberg 7 
SECTION II- The Trading Model 
Creating and testing a trading model demands a basic understanding of what a 
futures contract is and some of the variables that affect it. The model to be presented can 
be implemented in today's marketplace with predictable success. The first step in creating 
such a model is to determine the information to be used. This information will vary widely 
among futures traders because the price can be very expensive. The range is from free to 
over $300 dollars a month for real-time quotes. The free services like CNBC just show 
the Dow Jones Industrial composite, Standard & Poor's 500 stock index (S&P 500), 
National Association of Security Dealers Automatic Quotation system (NASDAQ) 
composite, and a ticker tape. The problem with this form of data is that these numbers 
will have to be manually entered into a trading program, a time-consuming process making 
intraday trading impossible. Manually entering numbers into a computer program at the 
end of day is only feasible for charting larger market trends. The important difference 
between these services is that real time gives continual price quotes of stocks, bonds, 
stock indexes, and commodities at the price they are currently being traded for via 
electronic data signals. These quotes are provided by real-time service providers such as 
Signal Company. 
The individual prices are transferred via television cable or by satellite. Cable is 
the preferred highway of transfer because most homes and business have easy access to it. 
If you purchase real-time data, Signal will send a receiver box and a password for 
installation at your trading location. Installation is a simple process of splicing the 
television cable to the back of the signal box and then hooking up a parallel port 
connection from the Signal receiver box to a personal computer (PC). Now that the (PC) 
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is physically connected to the receiver box the only other step is to install the software that 
Signal provides which configures the (PC) to accept the electronic data feed with the 
correct password. The last step in installation is customizing the computer program that 
will be able to utilize this expensive real-time data. 
MetaStock RT is one prominent computer program that will transform real-time 
data into usable charts, indicators, and studies. MetaStock RT collects real-time data 
from the Signal receiver and updates all of the designed instruments in use. Every price 
tick in the commodity trading pits results in updated information that providing the latest 
market information immediately. By utilizing this software a futures trader can enter 
many successful intraday trades. 
Unfortunately, limited economic resources can reduce real time trading 
possibilities. Therefore, the standard MetaStock for Windows ''version 5.1" presents a 
viable option for developing a futures trading modeL This software package costs around 
$300with no other data feed costs. All price quotes are manually entered at the end of the 
trading day. In view of the preceding considerations, MetaStock for Windows ''version 
5.1" is preferred. 
The last step before getting in and working with the parameters of the MetaStock 
software is to decide which commodity to trade. The (S&P 500) stock index represents a 
good trading vehicle. First is because of its popularity, meaning that many traders buy 
and sell (S&P 500) futures contracts, thereby leading to market equilibrium. According to 
Robert Daigler, this stock index has been rising in the number of contracts traded since its 
inception in 1982 (44). Approximately 60,000 (S&P 500) futures contracts are traded 
every day on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The second reason is its market breadth. 
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This stock index is composed of the 500 largest companies currently trading on the 
(NYSE) and (NASDAQ). The immense size ofthis stock composite assures traders of an 
accurate reflection of market strength, weakness, and, more importantly, direction. The 
third reason is that this index is directly tied to the cash price of the 500 composing 
companies, thus giving a perfect medium of exchange without ever having to deliver or 
receive shipment of goods. 
The trading model is interpreted by understanding the significance of each 
quadrant. The first quadrant contains a price oscillator which displays the difference 
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between two moving averages of a security's price. "Moving average analysis typically 
generates buy signals when a short term moving average (or security's price) 
rises above a longer-term moving average. Conversely, sell signals are 
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generated when a shorter -term moving average (or security's price) falls 
below a longer-term moving average. The Price Oscillator illustrates the 
cyclical and often profitable signals generated by these one- or two moving -
average systems." (Achilles 241) 
This difference is expressed in point form. When the moving average crosses the (0) line 
the model will signal to buy a futures contract if the moving average is coming out of 
negative territory and into positive. If the moving average is leaving positive ground and 
crossing the (0) line into negative, than a futures contract should be sold. The Price 
Oscillator's formula is ((shorter moving average - longer moving average) I shorter 
moving average) x 100. 
The second quadrant contains the Relative Strength Index. "The name Relative 
Strength Index is slightly misleading as the (RSI) does not compare the relative strength of 
two secu~ties, but rather the internal strength of a single security" (MetaStock 364). The 
formula for (RSI) = 100-[100/(1+(U/D))], where U =an average ofupward price change, 
and D = an average of downward price change. In this model it is immaterial if the (RSI) 
is one increasing (I) or two decreasing (D); what is crucial is whether or not the direction 
of movement is synonymous with Chaikin's Volatility indicator. 
The third quadrant contains Chaikin's Volatility indicator. Chaikin's volume 
accumulation is a sensitive intraday measure of volume in relation to price action (Murphy 
189). Volume analysis helps in identifYing internal strengths and weaknesses that exist 
under cover of price action. Very often, volume divergence and price movement are the 
only clues that an important reversal is about to take place. The Chaikin Oscillator is an 
excellent tool for generating buy and sell signals when its action is compared to price 
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movement. This indicator, as used in this model, needs to be moving in the same direction 
as the (RSI) before a futures trade is entered. For example, if the Price Oscillator is 
moving from positive territory to negative and both the (RSI) and Chaikin's Volatility 
indicator are decreasing, then a positive sell signal has occurred, and a futures contract 
should be sold. 
The fourth and final quadrant contains the price of the S&P 500 on that specific 
date. The small horizontal bar on the left-hand side of each intraday tick represents the 
opening price of this security while the horizontal bar on the right-hand side represents the 
closing price of the security on each respective day. The green channels that surround the 
security are Bollinger bands. These bands are plotted at two standard deviation levels 
above and below the moving average of the (S&P 500). These bands are significant 
because they help by statistically predicting the longer term direction of the commodity. 
The Research in the following section, shows some of the work generated for this 
trading model. Beginning on June 1, 1993, when the (S&P 500) was trading at 450 (see 
page 9) and continues through April4, 1997, when the (S&P 500) was trading at 760. 
Horizontal lines combine to give signals which are printed in three different colors. The 
blue color represents a signal yielding successful results. The red color represents a signal 
yielding unsuccessful results. Finally, the black color represents an incomplete signal that 
is never entered. 
The following is a portion of the trading model from September 27, 1993, through 
January 19, 1994. Note that on November 17, 1993, a futures trader can make money 
even when the commodity's price is declining (see page 12). 
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The following is a portion of the trading model from January 31, 1994, through 
I\fay 27, 1994. Even though the (S&P 500) decreased over this time period, the model 
still gave 3 signals, 2 of them being correct. 
4751· 
: l 
470 l 
455 1 
450. 
455. 
. .PAVIO.MWC • S&P 767.30 4/7/97 l!lljJ 
. ·t·· 
50 
a· 
Castleberg 13 
The following is a portion of the trading model from June 20, 1994, through 
October 13, 1994. On June 14, a perfect buy signal was generated by the trading model 
that predicted an upward trend throughout the whole month of August. 
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The following is a portion of the trading model from October 24, 1994, through 
February 17, 1995. It is unfortunate that the signal on December 16, 1994, was not 
complete, because the (S&P 500) trended nicely after this date. 
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The following is a portion of the trading model from February 8, 1995, through 
June 5, 1995. On March 10, a complete buy signal was generated which would result in 
over 100 (S&P 500) index points gained. 
- Q,f\VID.M C - S&P 167. 3 0 -it !'H 
The following is a portion of the trading model from August 3, 1995, through 
November 28, 1995. Volatility increased during the month of September causing the 
Bollinger bands to widen. 
OA'I/ID.MWC · S&P ,.. ' : ,_.. :-'f67.3U lt/1191 
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The following is a portion ofthe trading model from January 2, 1996, through 
April25, 1996. This time period was unusually Yolatile causing a lot of incomplete 
signals. 
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The following is a portion ofthe trading model from April25, 1996, through 
August 20, 1996. On July 5, a complete sell signal was given that captured over 30 (S&P 
500) stock index points. 
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The following is a portion of the trading model from August 27, 1996, through 
December 20, 1996. October 31, had a very important complete buy signal because the 
model quickly reversed back to a buy following the longer trend started in September. 
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The following is a portion of the trading model from December 9, 1995, through 
April 7, 1997. On December 31, a complete buy signal was generated that predicted the 
(S&P 500) stock index price direction for the next 2 months spanning over 50 points. 
OA'JID.MWC - S&P /67.30 ll·N/97 
.. -
830 
820 
810 
300 
790 
780 
770 
760 
750ir~--~~---+~~~ 
740 
730 
720 .. 
710 _,., 
~-
0 
830 
820 
810 
800 .li 790 
780 
770 l 
760 ! 750 
740 
730 
720 
710 
Castleberg 17 
In each of the forgoing examples of the trading model, the trader must enter a 
trade the following morning after a complete signal. If this had been done, 26 of the 32 
signals will be correct, giving this model a success rate of 81 percent. This success rate 
results in an optimistic gain of340 points, equaling $170,000. 
Castleberg 18 
SECTION m- Conclusion 
This model's success rate of predicting a price trend in the S&P 500 can be a 
major benefit to a futures trader. On the other hand, one major problem currently exists 
with this model. The model does not predict when to exit a trade. Research seems to 
indicate that a trader can enter the market the following day after a complete signal and at 
the same time, place a stop order, five points above the future's purchase price for a sell 
signal or five points below the future's purchase price for a buy signal. This stop order 
can then be moved down or up respectively to assure the trader's minimizing losses and 
maximizing gains. With a stop order of five points entered, the maximum loss will be 
$2500 plus minimal broker fees for each contract traded. 
Currently, research is being conducted to determine a successful indicator on when 
to exit a trade. Such ongoing study is imperative for a destined trader because, when he 
has enough capital, he can implement this model into active trading and realize economic 
benefits. 
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